We consider the dynamics of Q-learning in two-player two-action games with Boltzmann exploration mechanism. For any non-zero exploration rate the dynamics is dissipative, which guarantees that agent strategies converge to rest points that are generally different from the game's Nash Equlibria (NE). We provide a comprehensive characterization of the rest point structure for different games, and examine the sensitivity of this structure with respect to the noise due to exploration. Our results indicate that for a class of games with multiple NE the asymptotic behavior of learning dynamics can undergo drastic changes at a critical exploration rate. A somewhat counterintuitive manifestation of this behavior is that increasing noise might lead the agents to select a more optimal solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reinforcement Learning (RL) [1] is a powerful framework which allows an agent to behave near-optimally through a trial and error exploration of the environment. Although originally developed for single agent settings, RL approaches have been extended to scenarios where multiple agents learn concurrently by interacting with each other. The main difficulty in multi-agent learning is that, due to mutual adaptation of agents, the stationarity condition of single-agent learning environment is violated. Instead, each agent learns in a time-varying environment induced by the learning dynamics of other agents. Although in general multi-agent RL does not have any formal convergence guarantees (except in certain settings), it is known to often work well in practice.
Recently, a number of authors have addressed the issue of multi-agent learning from the perspective of dynamical systems [2] [3] [4] . For instance, it has been noted that for stateless Q-learning with Boltzmann exploration scheme, the dynamics of agent strategies can be described by (bi-matrix) replicator equations from population biology [5] , with an additional term that accounts for the exploration [6] [7] [8] . A similar approach for analyzing learning dynamics with ε-greedy exploration strategies [27] was developed in [9, 10] .
Most existing approaches so far have focused on numerical integration or simulation methods for understanding dynamical behavior of learning systems. Recently, [10] provided a full categorization of ε-greedy Q-learning dynamics in two-player two-action games using analytical insights from hybrid dynamical systems. A similar classification for softmax Q-learning (such as Boltzmann exploration), however, is lacking. On the other hand, a grow- [1] The ε-greedy Q-learning schema selects the action with highest Q value with probability (1 − ) + n and other actions with probability of n , where n is the number of the actions.
ing body of recent neurophysiological studies indicate that softmax selection might be a plausible mechanism for understanding decision making in primates. For instance, experiments with monkeys playing a competitive game indicate that their decision making is consistent with softmax value-based reinforcement learning [11, 12] . It has also been observed that in certain observational learning tasks humans seem to follow a softmax reinforcement leaning scheme [13] . Thus, understanding softmax learning dynamics and possible spectrum of behaviors is important both conceptually and for making concrete prediction about different learning outcomes.
Here we use analytical techniques to provide a complete characterization of Boltzmann Q-Learning in twoplayer two-action games, in terms of their convergence properties and rest point structure. In particular, it is shown that for any finite (non-zero) exploration rate, the learning dynamics necessarily converges to an interior rest point. This seems to be in contrast with previous observation [14] , where we believe the authors have confused slow convergence with limit cycles. Furthermore, none of the studies so far have systematically examined the impact of exploration, i.e., noise, on the learning dynamics and its asymptotic behavior. On the other hand, noise is believed to be inherent aspect of learning in humans and animals, either due to softmax selection mechanisms [15] , or random perturbations in agent utilities [16] .
Here we provide such analysis, and show that depending on the game, there can be one, two, or three rest points, with a critical bifurcation between different rest-point structures as one varies the exploration rate. In particular, there is a critical exploration rate above which there remains only one rest point, which is globally stable.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We next describe the connection between two-agent learning and replicator dynamics, and elaborate on non-conservative nature of dynamics for any finite exploration rate. In Section III we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the system under the assumption of symmetry, followed by a more general analysis of arbitrary (non-symmetric) case in Section IV. We provide some concluding remarks in Section V.
II. DYNAMICS OF Q-LEARNING
Here we provide a brief review of Q-learning algorithms and establish its connections with replicator dynamics.
A. Single Agent Learning
In Reinforcement Learning (RL) [1] agents learn to behave near-optimally through repeated interactions with the environment. At each step of interaction with the environment, the agent chooses an action based on the current state of the environment, and receives a scalar reinforcement signal, or a reward, for that action. The agent's overall goal is to learn to act in a way that will increase the long-term cumulative reward.
Although there are many different implementation of the above adaptation mechanisms, here we consider the so called Q-learning [17] , where the agents' strategies are parameterized through so called Q-functions that characterize relative utility of a particular action. Those Qfunctions are updated as the agent takes actions and observes rewards, according to
where α is the learning rate, 0 < γ < 1 is a discount factor and R(s, a) is the reward the agent receives when executing action a in state s. In the following, we will focus on the stateless scenario, and take γ = 0.
Generally, there are different ways the update rule can be applied. The most straightforward way is online update, when Q value for a particular action is updated whenever that action is played [17] . This, however, means that actions that are played often (rarely) will be updated often (rarely). To account for the discrepancy in update frequencies, one can normalize each update amount by the frequency of corresponding action [1, 18] . Another approach is to assume that there are two different time-scales, a shorter time scale where the agent plays with the environment and estimates the expected reward through those interactions, and a longer time scale along which the Q-values are updated.
Assume that the agent has a finite number of available actions, i = 1, 2, ..., n, and assume the Q i (t) is the Q value of the corresponding action at time t. Now, consider a time increment δt, and assume that the agent has sampled each of his actions to estimate its reward. Then, the Q value are updated as follows:
where r i is the expected reward of agent for taking action i. Next, we need to specify how the agent chooses actions. Greedy selection, which chooses an action with the highest Q value, might lead to locally optimal solution. Thus, one needs to incorporate some way of exploring less-optimal strategies. Two accepted choices are greedy, where the agent selects the best action with probability 1 − and randomizes over all the actions with probability . Another popular approach is softmax, or Bolzmann exploration mechanism, where the probability x i of selecting the action i is given by
Here the temperature T > 0 controls exploration/exploitation tradeoff: for T → 0 the agent always acts greedily and chooses the strategy corresponding to the maximum Q-value (exploitation), whereas for T → ∞ the agents' strategy choices are completely random (exploration).
To proceed further, we take the continuos time limit δt → 0 to obtain the following differential equation describing the evolution of the Q values:
Furthermore, we would like to express the dynamics in terms of strategies rather than the Q values. Toward this end, we differentiate Equation 2 with respect to time and use Equation 3. Differentiating 2, using Eqs. 3, 2, and scaling the time t → αt , we arrive at the following replicator equation:
The first term in Eq. 4 asserts that the probability of taking action i increases with a rate proportional to the overall efficiency of that strategy, while the second term describes the agent's tendency to randomize over possible actions. The steady state strategy profile, x s i , if it exists, can be found from equating the right hand side to zero, which can be shown to yield
We would like to emphasize that x s i corresponds to the so called Gibbs distribution for a statistical-mechanical system with energy −r i at temperature T . Indeed, it can be shown that the above replicator dynamics minimizes the following function resembling free energy:
Here we have denoted x = (x 1 , · · · , x n ) as a vector of size n. Note that the minimizing the first term is equivalent to maximizing the expected reward, whereas minimizing the second term means maximizing the entropy of the agent strategy. The relative importance of those terms is regulated by the choice of the temperature T . We note that recently a free energy minimization principle has been suggested as a framework for modeling perception and learning (see [19] for a review of the approach and its relation to several other neurobiological theories.)
B. Two-agent learning
Let us now assume there are two agents interacting with each other, so that the rewards received by the agents depend on their joint action. Let y = (y 1 , · · · , y n ) denote the strategy of the second agent. First, assume that the second agent does not learn (or learns at much longer time scales), so that the first agent in a static environment. Then its dynamics is still given be Eq. 4 where the reward for action i is now expressed through the strategies of the second agent,
where a ij is the reward of the first agent when he selects i and the second agent selects j. The generalization to the case when the second agent is learning is introduced via game-theoretical ideas [20] : the incremental reward of the first agent is represented as the average over all actions undertaken by the second agent, and vice versa. More specifically, let A and B be the two payoff matrices which account for the interaction between the agents. The combined system can then be described by the following system of equations:
Where (Ay) i is the i element of the vector Ay. This system (without the exploration term) is known as bimatrix replicator equation [20, 21] . Its relation to multiagent learning has been examined in [6, 8, 22, 23] . This dynamic has trivial pure strategies as fixed points on the vertices x i = 0, and also interior fixed point inside the faces of the simplex.
C. Exploration causes dissipation
It is known that for T = 0 the system Eqs. 8, 9 are conservative [20, 21] , so that the total phase space volume is preserved. It can be shown, however, that any finite exploration rate T > 0 makes the system dissipative or volume contracting [6] . While this fact might not be crucial in high-dimensional dynamical system, its implications for low-dimensional system, and specifically for two-dimensional dynamical system considered here are crucial. Namely, the finite dissipation rate means that the system cannot have any limit cycles, and the only possible asymptotic behavior is a convergence to a fixed point. Furthermore, in situation when there is only one interior fixed point, it is guaranteed to be globally stable.
To demonstrate the dissipative nature of the system for T > 0, it is useful to make the following transformation of variables
The replicator system in the modified variables reads [6, 21] 
Let us recall the Liouville formula: Ifż = F(z) is defined on the open set U in R n and if G ⊂ U has volume V (t) of G(t) = {x(t) : x ∈ G}, then the rate of change of a volume V, which contain of set of points G in the phase space is proportional to the divergence of F. Consulting with Equations 11, we observe that the dissipation rate is given by [6] 
As we mentioned above, the dissipative nature of the dynamics has important implications for two actions games that we consider next.
D. Two-action games
Let us consider two action games, and let x and y denote the probability of selecting the first action by the first and second agents, respectively. Then the learning dynamics Equations 8, 9 attain the following form:
where we have introduced
The vertices of the simplex {x, y} = {0, 1} are rest points of the dynamics. For any T > 0, those rest points can be shown to be unstable. This means that any trajectory that starts in the interior of the simplex, 0 < x, y < 1, will asymptotically converge to an interior rest point. The position of those rest points is found by nullifying the RHS of Eqs. 18, 15. For the rest of this paper, we will examine the rest point equations in details.
III. SYMMETRIC EQULIBRIA
First, we consider the case of interaction between one type of players(x = y). The learning dynamics Equation then attain the following form:
in which case we have (symmetric) rest points, Figure 1 where we plot both sides of the equation as a function of x. First of all, note that the RHS of Eq. 19 is a monotonically increasing function, assuming values in (−∞, ∞) as x changes between (0, 1). Thus, it is always guaranteed to have at least one solution. Further inspection shows that the number of possible rest points depends on the type of the game as well as the temperature T . For instance, there is a single solution whenever a ≤ 0, for which the LHS is a non-increasing function of x.
Graphical representation of Equation 19 is illustrated in
Next, we examine the condition for having more than one rest points, which is possible when a > 0. Consult with Figure 1 : For sufficiently large temperature, there is only single solution. When increasing T , however, a second solution appears exactly at the point where the LHS becomes tangential to the RHS. Thus, in addition to Equation 19 , at the critical temperature we should have
or, alternatively,
Plugging 21 into 19, we find
Thus, for any given a, the rest point equation has three solutions whenever b 
For small values of T when a is sufficiently large (and positive), the two branches b − c and b + c are well separated. When one increases T , however, at some critical value those two branches meet and a cusp bifurcation occurs [24] . The point where the two bifurcation curves meet can be shown to be (a, b) = (4, −2), and is called a cusp point. Saddle-node bifurcation occurs all along the boundary of the reigns (except at the cusp point, where one has a codimension-2 bifurcation -i.e., two parameters have to be tuned for this type of bifurcation to take place). This boundary in the parameter space is shown in Figure 2(a) .
a. Linear Stability Analysis We briefly elaborate on the dynamic stability of the interior rest points given by Equation 19 . Note that, whenever there is a single rest point (e.g., a < 0), it will be (globally) stable due to the dissipative nature of the dynamics. Thus, we focus on the case when there are multiple rest points. We linearize the Eq. 18 (with y replaced by x) around an interior rest point x 0 , and find that the stability condition is ax 0 (1 − x 0 ) < 1. Recalling that at the tangential point we have a = 1 x0(1−x0) , it is straightforward to demonstrate that for the middle rest-point the above condition is always violated, meaning that it is always unstable. Similar reasoning shows that two other rest points are locally stable, and depending on the starting point of the learning trajectory, the system will converge to one of the two points.
IV. GENERAL CASE
We now examine the most general case. We find it useful to introduce variables u = ln
Then the rest point equations can be rewritten as where a, b , c, and d are alreday defined in 16, 17. Eliminating v we obtain
Equation 25 can be analyzed using the techniques introduced for the symmetric case. Its graphical representation is shown in Figure 4 (a). A simple analysis reveals that for ac < 0 there is only one interior rest point, which is globally stable. When ac > 0 it is possible to have two or three interior rest points. In case there are two restpoints, one of them is unstable and the other is globally stable. In case of three interior rest point, two of them are locally stable and one is unstable. At the point where multiple solutions appear we have, in addition to Equation 25, the following condition:
which defines the bifurcation boundary in the asymmetric case. The flows generated by the dynamics in two regimes are depicted in Figure 2 (b) and 2(c).
A. Examples
We now illustrate the above findings on several examples shown in Fig. 3 . First, we focus on games that have a dominant action, such as Prisoner's Dillema (PD). This class of games have a unique pure NE which corresponds to the dominant action. For this games we have (a 12 − a 22 )(a 21 − a 11 ) < 0 and (
. Thus, there can be only one interior rest point. Furthermore, due to the dissipative nature of the dynamics, the system is guaranteed to converge to this rest point. Note that this is in stark contrast from the behavior reported in [10] , where the authors reported that, starting from some initial conditions, the learning dynamics might never converge, instead alternating between different strategy regimes. The lack of convergence and chaotic behavior in their case can be attributed to the hybrid nature of the dynamics. A similar idea holds for games which have a single mixed NE, such as the Matching Pennies (MP) game. Any finite exploration will perturb the position of the NE, and make it globally stable due to dissipative dynamics.
Next, let us consider games with two pure and one mixed NEs. An example is a coordination game shown in Fig. 3 . Since a > 0, c > 0, the learning dynamics has three rest points for sufficiently small T (i.e., when a is sufficiently large). Intuitively, these three rest points correspond to the three NE of the game. For small T the rest points corresponding to the pure equilibria are stable, while the one corresponding to the mixed equilibrium is unstable. Furthermore, when increasing the exploration rate, there is a critical value T c beyond which the two equilibria disappear and only one remains (see Figure 4(b) ). Note that the upper branch in Figure 4 (b) corresponds to payoff-dominant NE. Thus, the bifurcation diagram above suggests, somewhat counterintuitively, that increasing noise can have an overall beneficial effect as it forces the system to converge to a more optimal rest point. In general coordination game under Boltzmann Q-Learning agents are more likely to adopt the risk dominant equilibrium than the payoff dominant equilibrium. One exception in coordination game is when a 12 = a 21 , when two actions have the same rewards and neither of action are risk-dominant. Here the mixed NE is a random strategy which is the only rest point for T > T c . It is interesting to examine the dynamics at the boundary of different games. Let us consider the following parameterized game matrix: a 11 = 1, a 12 = 2, a 21 = 0, a 22 = , which is a coordination game for > 2, and a dominant action game for < 2, so that = 2 corresponds to the boundary of those two classes. A straightforward analysis shows that for = 2 one has T c = 0: any T > 0 leaves only one (risk-dominant) equilibrium.
Finally, consider anti-coordination-type games such as Chicken, which also has two pure and one mixed NE. Again, for small exploration rates, there are three restpoints corresponding to three NEs. However, there is a critical value T c above which only one of those restpoints survives. In contrast to the coordination game, where the surviving rest-point corresponds to one of the pure NE, here the surviving rest-point corresponds to the mixed NE. The corresponding bifurcation diagram is shown in 4(c).
V. DISCUSSION
We have presented a comprehensive analysis of two agent Q-learning dynamics with Boltzmann exploration mechanism. For any two action game at finite exploration rate the dynamics is dissipative and thus it is guaranteed to reach a rest point asymptotically. We demonstrated that, depending on the game, the rest point structure of the learning dynamics is different. Namely, for games with a single NE (either pure or mixed) there is a single globally stable rest point for any positive exploration rate. Furthermore, we analytically examined the impact of exploration/noise on the asymptotic behavior, and showed that in games with multiple NE the restpoint structure undergoes a bifurcation so that and above a critical exploration rate only one globally stable solution persists. Previously, a similar observation for certain games was observed numerically in Ref. [25] , where the authors studied Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) among agents with bounded rationality. In fact, one can easily show that QRE corresponds to the rest-point of the Boltzmann Q-learning dynamics.
We suggest that the sensitivity of the learning dynamics on exploration rate can be useful for validating various hypotheses about possible learning mechanisms in experiments. Indeed, most empirical studies so far has been limited to games with a single equilibrium, such as matching pennies, where the dynamics is rather insensitive to the exploration rate. We believe that for different games (such as coordination or chicken game), the fine-grained nature of the rest point structure, and specifically, its sensitivity to the exploration rate, can provide much reacher information about learning mechanisms employed by the agents.
Note Added: After completing the manuscript, we became aware of a very recent work reporting similar results [26] , which studies convergence properties and bifurcation in the solution structure using local stability analysis. For games with a single rest point such a Prisoner's Dilemma, local stability is subsumed by the global stability demonstrated here. The bifurcation results are similar, even though [26] studies only coordination games and does not differentiate between continuous and discontinuous pitchfork bifurcation. Finally, the analytical form of the phase diagram Eq. 23 for the symmetric case is complementary to results presented in [26] .
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